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Abstract Besides the more commonly used REITs, German investors can also
invest in a lesser-known real estate vehicle, Open-ended Property Funds. OPFs
are considered a compromise between listed and direct real estate investments.
OPF fund managers generally provide daily (perfect) liquidity. However, if
liquidity falls below 5%, share redemptions in these funds can be temporarily
suspended for a period of up to two years. During this time, investors will only
be able to sell shares on the secondary market (exchange), and are thus subject
to significant liquidity risk. The objective of this paper is to analyze whether
OPFs add value to investor portfolios above that provided by REITs. We show
that OPFs have a diversification advantage over REITs in low-risk portfolios,
despite their larger potential liquidity risk. REIT liquidity is comparable to that
of ordinary common stock, but OPFs exhibit an average initial discount to
funds’ NA V of about 6% when share redemptions are temporarily suspended.
However, in the long-run, this potential redemption suspension does not
negatively influence OPF performance (in case OPFs reopen again). This
makes OPFs an attractive investment alternative to REITs for investors who
have a high level of risk aversion and a long-term investment horizon, such as
endowments, insurance companies, and pension funds.
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Over the past two decades, investments in real estate have increased dramatically.
This growth is at least partially driven by the perceived diversification benefits that
real estate offers in multi-asset portfolios. Both direct and listed real estate
investments can take advantage of these benefits. However, although the underlying
asset is the same, direct and listed real estate investments have very different
institutional set-ups and hence different risk-return profiles (for example, the
volatility of respective indices for listed real estate is much higher than for direct
real estate—see Table 6).
Surprisingly, the preferred real estate investment type differs significantly across
countries. For example, U.S. and U.K. investors prefer to invest in listed real estate,
while German investors invest almost exclusively in a hybrid real estate portfolio
investment vehicle called Open-ended Property Funds (OPFs).
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OPFs are generally considered a compromise between direct and listed real estate
investments. Fund managers invest directly in an internationally diversified real
estate portfolio, while holding a cash-equivalent position ranging from 5% to 49% of
assets under management to ensure daily liquidity. The resulting historical returns are
appealing to investors in terms of attractive risk-adjusted returns, with little risk and
low correlation with other asset classes.
However, these advantages come with the downside that OPFs must temporarily
suspend share redemptions if fund liquidity falls below 5%. In this case, fund
managers have a maximum of two years to either attract sufficient new asset inflows
and/or to sell portfolio properties to regain fund liquidity. During this time, investors
cannot redeem shares, but they can sell them in a secondary market (stock
exchange). There is the additional risk that fund management may again be unable to
guarantee liquidity, and may even have to sell all the properties at a loss (this is
referred to as a “fire-sale”). Such controlled liquidation may become necessary
because the liquidation prices are likely to be lower than the going-concern prices.
The liquidation proceeds would then be distributed pro rata to the fund investors.
In this case, the realized prices for the sold properties, however, are highly uncertain.
Thus, OPF investors bear substantial liquidity risks, as follows: 1) the reduced
marketability when funds temporarily suspend share redemptions, and 2) the realized
property sale prices in case of a “fire-sale” or a controlled liquidation.
The aim of this paper is to compare two types of real estate investments, and to
determine whether the German OPF structure adds value relative to the more widely
used REIT structure. If this is the case, we believe there could be extensive
implications for other countries, who may also want to consider introducing this
structure. We thus need to not only compare the risk-return characteristics of both
structures, but also their different liquidity properties.
We first examine the diversification benefits of OPFs. Then, we contrast the
liquidity characteristics of REITs with the potential liquidity risks of OPFs caused by
the suspension of share redemptions, and explore the impact on investors.
1 See the BVI Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management e.V . press release from June 22, 2010
(BVI Press Release 2010) for a detailed composition of OPFs’ portfolio structures.
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that they would not obtain from REIT investments, especially in low-risk portfolios.
However, there is a significant difference in liquidity risk between OPFs and REITs.
While the liquidity of REITs is similar to that of ordinary common stocks, the
liquidity of OPFs depends on whether shares are currently redeemable. OPF
investments are thus especially favorable for investors with a high level of risk
aversion and a long-term investment horizon, such as endowments, insurance
companies, and pension funds. These investors have more freedom to withstand a
suspension period, and can better take advantage of the value-added of OPFs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: “The German OPF Market”
introduces Open-ended Property Funds and describes the construction of an
appropriate market index. “Diversification Benefits of Real Estate” illustrates their
diversification benefits, while section 4 discusses REIT liquidity. Section 5 evaluates
OPF liquidity risk by presenting our examination of fund returns around the
temporary suspension of share redemptions. Section 6 summarizes our main results,
and gives our conclusions.
The German OPF Market
Fundamental Features
From a legal perspective, an OPF is a separate special asset, with an investment
focus on property initiated and managed by a capital investment company. For
investor protection purposes, OPFs are controlled by regulations for identifying,
diversifying, and controlling risks, as well as for realizing gains and fund
liquidity.
2
OPFs were first created in 1959, with the establishment of the “Internationales
Immobilien Institut” (the international real estate institute, known as iii-investments).
The first German OPF was iii-funds No. 1. Since 1991, there have been enough
OPFs for a meaningful index formation and statistical evaluation, but in recent years,
the growth of the market has exploded. For example, in 1998, there were sixteen
OPFs, with assets under management of 43.1 billion Euros. As of April 2010, the
market had grown to forty-five funds managing 90 billion Euros.
Real estate investment vehicles similar to OPFs exist in several European Union
member countries. However the German OPF market is by far the biggest, and its
market capitalization is about one-third that of all European Union member
countries.
3
Table 1 provides an overview of the full sample of OPFs from 1991 through April
2010. For our analysis, we use all OPFs that report their data to the “BVI
Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management e.V .” (the German Investment
and Asset Management Association). To test for consistency, we compared the
investment share prices from BVI with the prices obtained from Datastream. We
2 See Investmentgesetz (InvG) and (Klug 2008) for further details.
3 According to data from the BVI Bundesverband Investment, Asset Management e.V . (German Asset
Management and Investment Association), and Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central Bank).
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differences exceeded 1% of the stock price. In the case of a pricing difference, we
asked the capital investment company for the price.
For the further analyses, we used all OPFs that are or were covered by the BVI
and Datastream, which ensures the highest possible data accuracy and that the
calculated indices are not affected by survivorship bias. However, our results
remained stable when all OPFs were included. This is not surprising, as our sample
covers at least 94% of the market.
4 Therefore, we find that our results are not
affected by a biased data-generating approach.
In contrast with many other countries, in Germany, OPFs are preferred over real
estate shares as an alternative investment. OPFs offer three significant advantages,
and their regulatory design is similar to the OPF markets in European Union member
countries:
5
The OPF share price is not determined by supply and demand as long as the OPF
provides liquidity. Therefore, share prices do not differ from the NA V per share
reported by the capital investment companies when there is no temporary
redemption suspension. This means that OPF returns tend to be quite smooth,
because there is no additional influence from (equity) capital markets.





















Table 1 Overview of the
German OPF market. This table
shows the number of active
OPFs in the German market and
their assets under management,
which are calculated as of
year-end. Except for 2010, the
reference date is April. Data
come from BVI and Thomson
Financial Datastream
4 Tables and figures are available from the authors upon request.
5 See, for example, (Maurer et al. 2004).
D. Schweizer et al.The number of issued shares varies, which generally ensures high liquidity. As in
any investment fund, there is a daily issuance of new shares from buyers and a daily
redemption of old shares from sellers.
6
The rule of risk-spreading governs transactions.
7 This diversification significantly
reduces unsystematic risk.
These specific features of OPFs substantially influence their risk-return
profile. In general, portfolio returns are determined by 1) rental income, 2)
maintenance costs, 3) value increases or decreases, and 4) payments from fixed
income investments.
8 (1), (2), and (4) are relatively easy to determine; the primary
challenge is gauging changes in value if comparable properties do not trade
regularly. Thus, German investment law (§70 para. 2 sentence 2 InvG) mandates
that properties be evaluated at least once a year by an independent appraisal board
to determine true market value. The appraisal board members have technical
expertise in the area of property market development (§77 para. 2 sentence 1
InvG).
This valuation by law allows the sales comparison approach, the cost
approach, and the income approach for the appraisal of fair market value. The
income approach is internationally accepted, and is the primary method for
valuing OPFs. It appraises a property on the basis of objectively evaluated price
and income forecasts, as well as dynamic capitalization rates on the valuation
date. Therefore, the daily NA Vs of an OPF are based on the annual expert
appraisals since the last valuation date, but do not necessarily represent “true”
daily property values.
This valuation approach aims to minimize subjective views about future
expectations
9 and to dampen over- and understatements of property values.
However, because past appraisal reports are included in the determination of current
NA Vs, valuation returns are smoothed, an effect known as “appraisal-smoothing.”
10
Smoothing, as well as the less frequent valuations, results in positive autocorrelation
of the OPF returns.
11 The autocorrelation thus significantly underestimates OPF risk
(e.g., volatility).
In this paper, we perform an unsmoothing of returns as a correction using
Getmansky et al. (2004) method to recompute the return series so that it is free of
autocorrelation. This method is based on the estimation of a general moving average
process. It can detect arbitrary autocorrelation structures, and can thus cope with
annual reappraisals.
6 Historically, there have only been two periods when share redemptions were temporarily suspended
(2005/2006 and 2008/2010). Both are discussed in more detail in “OPF Liquidity”.
7 At the time of purchase, a property may not constitute more than 15% of the OPF’sN A V . Furthermore,
the total value of all properties with individual values of more than 10% of a fund’sN A V may not
constitute more than 50% of the fund’sN A V . See InvG § 73 (1).
8 More than 40% of OPF portfolio properties have leases with residual terms that extend longer than
January 1, 2014. See the (BVI Bundesverband Investment and Asset Management e.V . press release from
July 1, 2008 (BVI Press Release 2008)).
9 See (Archner 2006) for an extensive analysis.
10 See (Ross and Zisler 1991) and (Geltner 1991) for an extensive discussion.
11 Other, more secondary, reasons are inflation-linked lease contracts and the inclusion of inflation in the
appraisal. (Maurer et al. 2004) show in this context that the autocorrelation of real returns is substantially
lower.
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expert appraisals at certain valuation dates exhibit less volatility than those based on
transactions or new lease agreements.
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Construction of Open-ended Property Fund Indices
To construct an OPF index, we first need to calculate a representative index. We
consider all funds covered by the BVI and Datastream
13 beginning in February 1991
(because we have a sufficient number of funds from this date onward), and ending in
April 2010. The monthly raw data from the OPFs contain share prices (Pi,t) for each
month-end. The data are adjusted for share splits and reported net of management
fees. Therefore, further analysis is not biased favorably toward OPFs. Dividend
payouts are re-invested in the respective fund (before taxes).
For all OPFs, we calculate a monthly pre-tax return based on adjusted share prices
as follows:
Ri;t ¼




Next, using the pre-tax returns of the individual funds, we calculate a value-














where nt is the number of funds at time t, and wi,t is the weight of fund i at time t.
The weight of each fund is calculated by dividing the assets of the fund by the total
assets of all funds (see Table 1 for more details). Our index can thus be considered a
total return index. We use the value-weighted index in the following analyses,
14 and
we use (Getmansky et al. 2004) method to correct for autocorrelation.
Diversification Benefits of Real Estate
To compare the diversification benefits of REITs and OPFs, we perform a standard
Markowitz portfolio optimization. We include our OPF index and the FTSE
NAREIT Index as a proxy for REITs, as well as international standard indices for
stock and bond markets and alternative investments (see Table 6 for a detailed
listing).
12 See (McAllister et al. 2003) and (Pagliari et al. 2004) for more detailed discussions.
13 As a robustness check, we compute three different indices, because not all OPFs are investable, and
some funds require a high minimum investment. The first index represents the total OPF market, the
second includes only investable funds, and the third includes only funds investable for retail investors.
There are only marginal differences among the three indices, and our results do not depend on which one
is used. Therefore, we use the total market index in the following analysis. For the other index concepts,
tables are available upon request from the authors.
14 Different calculation methods did not lead to any changes in our results, so we use only the value-
weighted index as per (Maurer et al. 2004). Tables for an equally weighted index are available from the
authors upon request.
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that OPFs have an average monthly return of 0.49%, while REITs have a higher
average monthly return of 1.09% (see Table 6). However, OPFs with a 3.15%
monthly standard deviation have a much lower risk than REITs at 6.35%. Note that
OPFs and REITs both exhibit positive kurtosis. However, OPFs also exhibit positive
skewness, while REITs have a negative skewness, which indicates the potential for
tail risks.
Furthermore, by comparing the correlation structures of both products, we note
that OPFs are almost uncorrelated with all other asset classes. REITs show a
significant correlation with stock markets. This is thus a distinct diversification
advantage for OPFs (see Table 7).
Figure 1 shows the portfolio composition resulting from the Markowitz portfolio
optimization of the efficient frontier.
From Fig. 1, we see that the OPF allocation in the minimum standard deviation
portfolio reaches the maximum possible portfolio weight of 20%. Thereafter, its
weight decreases slowly as expected return increases. On the other hand, the REITs
allocation starts at 0% and steadily increases to the maximum level.
This indicates that OPFs offer better diversification benefits for low-risk
portfolios, and REITs offer better diversification benefits for higher-risk portfolios.
15
Consequently, despite being based on the same underlying asset, the benefits to
investors for both products are quite different. In the next two sections, we
emphasize how their different institutional setups cause their differences in liquidity.
REIT Liquidity
Public REITs are listed on stock exchanges like shares of common stock in other
firms. However, their institutional characteristics differ. We would thus also expect to
find differences in the market microstructure of REITs compared to common stocks.
However, a priori, it is not clear whether these differences should also lead to
liquidity differences.
Although there is an enormous amount of literature on liquidity in financial
markets, there is no single measure of liquidity. According to Kyle (1985), liquidity
of financial assets includes three transactional characteristics: 1) tightness, the cost of
liquidating a position over a short period of time; 2) depth, the ability to buy or sell
large quantities of shares with minimal price impact; and 3) resilience, the propensity
of prices to recover quickly from a random shock to the market.
Early results on the differences between REITand non-REITstock liquidity have
been mixed. For example, Ghosh et al. (1996) find that REIT liquidity is less than
comparable non-REIT liquidity. But Nelling et al. (1995) find that REIT liquidity is
similar to that for non-REITstocks.
15 We used three robustness checks to determine the stability of the results from the Markowitz portfolio
optimization: 1) additional risk measures such as conditional value at risk, lower partial moment 2, and
maximum drawdown to address potential tail risks from non-normally distributed return distributions, 2) a
February 1991–September 2007 observation period to test for the influence of the financial crisis on our
results, and 3) weight restrictions. All the checks showed that our results for REITs and OPFs remain
qualitatively stable. Tables and figures are available from the authors upon request.
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during the rapid growth of the REIT market during the 1990s. Bhasin et al. (1997)
and Below et al. (1996) find that REIT liquidity increased in the early 1990s. In
contrast, Clayton and MacKinnon (2000) documented the opposite.
These studies, however, used different liquidity measures. The first two used
the bid-ask spread as the relevant liquidity measure, and hence found a measure
of tightness. The latter study used ask or bid depth, respectively, and hence
found a measure of depth. This potentially explains their conflicting findings.
Furthermore, Glascock et al. (2004) found that REIT liquidity decreased in
declining markets.
International evidence on REIT liquidity is provided by Brounen et al. (2009).
Their study compares REIT liquidity for the U.S., the U.K., Continental Europe, and
Australia, and finds significant differences across countries and between REIT and
non-REIT liquidity. However, they do not determine conclusively whether REIT or
non-REIT liquidity is larger.
Determinants of REIT liquidity is another important topic in the literature. Bhasin
et al. (1997) find that bid-ask spreads are a decreasing function of share prices. Many
studies also found that liquidity is negatively related to insider ownership (see, e.g.,
Nelling et al. 1995; Below et al. 1996; Bhasin et al. 1997; Benveniste et al. 2001).
However, Cole (1998) and Chiang and V enkatesh (1998) found no such relationship.
Finally, Bertin et al. (2005) examine intraday REIT liquidity. They find a U-
shaped pattern similar to the pattern commonly observed for non-REIT stocks.
In summary, there is no clear evidence of whether REIT or non-REIT
liquidity is larger. However, all the studies tend to conclude that the range of
REIT liquidity is comparable to that of non-REIT liquidity, and that it decreases
in declining markets.
OPF Liquidity
In contrast to REITs, OPF liquidity must be investigated in two different regimes. In
the first, when the fund management accepts share redemptions, investors have
Fig. 1 Composition of efficient
portfolios. This figure shows the
portfolio weights for the asset
classes in the portfolios on the
efficient frontier, with standard
deviations as risk measures
dependent on the expected
return. For the calculations,
every index portfolio weight is
restricted to the range of 0%–
20%. The observation period is
February 1991–April 2010
D. Schweizer et al.perfect liquidity (as long as the redemption amount is smaller than the liquidity
reserve) and can redeem at fund NA Vs. In the second, when share redemptions are
temporarily suspended, investors can only sell shares on a stock exchange (Börse
Hamburg) at market prices instead of the NA V . Market prices are naturally a function
of trading activity, and are therefore affected by (potential) liquidity risks.
To analyze OPF liquidity risk, we focus on the second regime. We gauge
performance during the temporary suspension of share redemption (short-term
valuation effects), and when investors hold instead of selling the OPFs on a stock
exchange (long-term valuation effects). But before we present those results, we must
first introduce the German OPF regulatory framework.
In principle, OPFs must redeem shares on a daily basis, so they always hold a
certain level of liquid assets because property cannot be sold quickly. German
investment law requires that OPFs hold a minimum of 5% (and a maximum of 49%)
of their assets in cash or easily liquefied investments (§ 80 InvG). This liquidity
reserve, which is typically invested in money market instruments and bonds,
theoretically guarantees the redemption of outstanding shares at all times. Hence, the
risk-return profile of OPFs does not correspond to a pure property position, but is
positively correlated with bond markets (see Table 7).
16
With daily share redemption, however, comes the risk that investors may redeem
too many shares over too short a period, and may render the liquidity position too
small to satisfy all the redemptions. As we have noted if the liquidity reserve falls
below 5%, share redemption may be suspended in order to raise money by, e.g.,
selling property investments. This temporary suspension may last up to two years (§
80c para. 2 InvG and § 81 InvG).
17
Crises in the real estate markets, which are the main cause of temporary
suspensions of share redemptions, often occur after a capital markets crisis. If old
rental contracts expire, for example, new contracts may yield lower rental income,
and past sale prices may no longer be realizable. For OPFs, this lagged impact is
even more pronounced, because OPF management has an incentive to maintain the
(probably) “high valued appraisals” and successively adjust the NA V to market
developments. If investors anticipate such a development, it is possible that
substantially more shares may be redeemed than issued, and over a shorter than
usual time period.
When OPFs temporarily suspend share redemptions, investors have the option of
selling their shares in the secondary market. However, the prices in the secondary
market do not necessarily correspond to the NA Vs calculated by the capital
investment companies. In fact, they tend to be lower because of, e.g., slower value
adjustments by management, earnings management, appraisals, and liquidity
reduction. Therefore, the secondary market is truly reflective of the market’s
assessment of share value, because the NA V might not be. We assess the
consequences for investors over the short- and long-term in the next three
subsections.
16 See (Maurer et al. 2004; 2012) and (Gullett and Redman 2005) for more extensive discussions.
17 By law, a fund may only suspend redemptions for a maximum of twelve months. By contractual
agreement, this can be extended to twenty-four months. Alternatively, management may opt to only
partially suspend redemptions, so that shares can only be redeemed monthly instead of daily.
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In the more than fifty-year history of German OPFs, the temporary suspension of
share redemptions has happened only twice (2005/2006 and 2008/2010).
18 Because
each period had a different impetus for the suspension, we analyze each separately.
Prior to the 2005/2006 suspension, the market feared that some funds would need
to revalue at least part of their property portfolios. This high appraisal uncertainty led
to massive share redemptions in a short period, and three funds temporarily
suspended redemptions.
On December 13, 2005, Deutsche Bank Real Estate suspended share redemptions
in its OPF Grundbesitz-Invest until March 3, 2006, in order to conduct a complete
revaluation of property. This followed a massive outflow of investments (more than
1 billion Euros, or 300 million Euros in the three days before the suspension), as
fund management expected a devaluation of several hundred million Euros.
On January 17 and 19, 2006, KanAm temporarily suspended share redemptions in
two of their OPFs, Grundinvest US and Grundinvest, after investors redeemed more
than 700 million Euros worth of shares within a few days. The apparent reason was a
negative rating agency report, which led to a panic among investors. KanAm,
however, did not need a property revaluation, and used the three-month suspension
to regain the required liquidity. No devaluation followed, and, in fact, some
properties were sold at great gains. The funds were reopened on March 31, 2006,
and April 13, 2006.
In comparison, the 2008/2010 temporary suspension was much more dramatic
and affected the entire OPF market. It occurred in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis, when investors increased their preference for liquidity and were
fearful of tying up capital in the OPF market for an uncertain time (up to two years).
Thus, this second crisis proved to be a global one.
During the short time period of October 27–30, 2008, twelve OPFs announced
temporary suspensions of share redemptions. In January 2009, the first OPF
reopened, and, through December 2009, eight more followed suit. However, in
November 2009 and May 2010, five OPFs that had reopened were forced to
temporarily suspend share redemptions once again.
Estimation of Short-term V aluation Effects
In order to measure the valuation effects of the suspensions, we obtained detailed
data from the regional exchange Börse Hamburg, where all secondary market
transactions of OPFs take place. The data contain for every transaction for all traded
OPFs the trading price and number of traded shares for all trading days over the
January 2, 2004–June 1, 2010 period, which includes both crisis periods.
Figure 2 illustrates that the average number of traded funds in the secondary
market as well as the average trading volume increased significantly during the crisis
periods (see Table 2 for statistical significance). However, trading volume decreased
sharply again as the suspensions continued. Note further that the second crisis had an
especially high impact on trading volume, which increased to an average daily peak
18 For a detailed description of events during the 2005/2006 period, see, e.g., (Bannier et al. 2007).
D. Schweizer et al.of about 10 million Euros (compared to an average daily peak of about 4 million
during the first crisis).
We next measure market reactions to the share suspensions by calculating their
discounts on the secondary market compared to the net asset value (NA V) calculated
around the disclosure date (t0) by the OPFs themselves. Following Brown and
Warner (1985) and Fuller et al. (2002), we use standard event study methodology to















8t ¼ t0   t1;...;t0 þ t2; ð3Þ
where NAVt
(i) is the NA Vof a traded OPF i at time t, as reported by the OPF, SPt
(i)
equals the secondary market price of the traded OPF i at time t, and ADt stands for
the average discount for all suspended traded OPFs (I) at time t.
In our next step, we aim to calculate the average abnormal discount (AADt ). In
other words, we are interested in determining the difference between the discounts
from the traded temporarily suspended OPFs, and those that remained open.
Let I1 denote the OPFs that suspended share redemptions, and I2 denote the OPFs
that continued to accept share redemptions. We calculate the difference for the





























8t ¼ t0   t1;...;t0 þ t2:
ð4Þ
We use a standard t-test statistic to draw statistical inferences about the different
event windows for the average discounts (AD) and the average abnormal discounts












































































5-day average number of traded OPFs
5-day average volume
Fig. 2 Number and volume of traded OPFs in the secondary market. This figure shows the daily five-day
average number of traded OPFs and the five-day average trading volume from January 2004–June 2010.
See Table 8 for a detailed listing of temporarily suspended OPFs
Do Alternative Real Estate Investment V ehicles Add V alue to REITs…significantly for OPFs that announce they are suspending share redemptions. These
results hold for all event windows.
19
The average discount was about 0% before the suspension announcement, and it
increased to approximately 6%. This increase clearly reflects investors’ liquidity
preference, and that investors price temporarily suspended OPFs at a discount. There
are three sources of uncertainty for investors surrounding temporary share
redemptions: 1) when the funds will begin to accept share redemptions again (note
again that the time period can be up to two years), 2) whether OPF management will
be forced to sell portfolio properties to ensure liquidity (fractional selling or
controlled liquidation), which can result in uncertainty about potential selling prices
(“fire-sale”), and 3) the fact that investors can only use the secondary market when
they suspect that OPF portfolio properties may depreciate.
The discount thus reflects 1) a premium for reduced OPF liquidity (perfect
liquidity versus secondary market liquidity) and uncertainty over the duration of the
suspension period (up to two years), and 2) the write-off potential if funds are forced
to sell or revalue properties. Investors react to the uncertainty by incorporating into
(secondary) market prices the new information that some OPFs have temporarily
halted share redemptions.
Furthermore, we can see that the dynamics in the secondary market for OPFs
change when some funds announce suspensions (see Table 2 and Fig. 2). During
both crisis periods, trading volume and the number of traded OPFs in the secondary
market increased significantly, which indicates that investors use the secondary
market more frequently when OPFs stop providing liquidity.
However, the observed discounts can reflect either reduced liquidity or expected
NA V depreciations. For this reason, we need to determine whether the initial
discount (defined as the average of the [0,+5] event window) in response to the
change in marketability has forecasting ability, and whether it can be explained
partially by market expectations about future developments.
19 We also calculate ADt and AADt based on capital instead of equal weighting. The results remain stable.
Tables are available upon request from the authors.
Table 2 Secondary market comparison of market phases when all OPFs are redeemable and when some
are temporarily suspended. This table shows the average abnormal discount (AAD) for different event
windows, both tested for statistical significance. In the columns “Abnormal Trading V olume” and “Traded
OPFs,” we test the hypotheses that we will find higher trading volume and a higher number of OPFs
traded during the specific event windows than when no OPF is temporarily suspended























c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
D. Schweizer et al.Using a logit model, we first analyze whether the initial discount implies that the
OPF management depreciates (writes down) property values during the suspension
period (see Table 3). Next, we examine the accumulated depreciations
20 during the
suspension, and we use standard ordinary least square regressions to determine
whether the initial discount explains these depreciations (see Table 4).
The logit model illustrates that the magnitude of the initial discount can explain
whether OPF management will conduct depreciations during the suspension period
(see Table 3). This finding supports the fact that observed discounts are not due
solely to decreased liquidity, but are also a proxy for investor perceptions of the
future depreciation potential.
However, we find that the controlling variable “size” is not statistically
significant. Remarkably, the size of the OPF does not affect the depreciation
probability. One could argue that bigger OPFs may have aggressively written up
portfolio properties in the past, and therefore showed above-average returns. This in
turn could have attracted substantial new fund inflows, which would have a higher
write-off potential. However, we cannot demonstrate such a relationship here.
Furthermore, whether the suspension occurred during the first or second crisis period
also does not significantly affect the depreciation probability.
When explaining accumulated depreciation, we find a slightly different picture
(see Table 4). The initial discount can still explain the depreciation behavior
(meaning a higher initial discount results in higher depreciations during the
suspension period). The period dummy is also statistically significant with a
negative sign, which suggests that the depreciation potential during the first crisis
period was lower than that for the second crisis period.
Estimation of Long-Term V aluation Effects
In contrast to the short-term valuation analysis where we analyzed the discounts in
the secondary market, we now compare the short-term results with a buy-and-hold





























Days relative to temporal suspension
Average discount of suspended OPFs
Fig. 3 Average discount of
suspended OPFs relative to
temporary share redemptions.
This figure shows the average
abnormal discount of suspended
OPFs for both the 2005/2006
and the 2008/2010 crisis periods
(as calculated in Eq. (4)) relative
to the suspension date t0. See
Table 8 for a detailed listing of
temporarily suspended OPFs
20 We calculate accumulated depreciation by checking press releases and semiannual and annual reports of
OPFs. When no or insufficient information was provided, we asked public relations departments directly
for the information, and we cross-checked the material with their press releases, reports, and newspaper
articles found in LexisNexis and Factiva.
Do Alternative Real Estate Investment V ehicles Add V alue to REITs…then reopened again. We calculate performance for investors who held their shares
instead of selling them on the secondary market. We also calculate the abnormal
returns of the temporarily suspended OPFs compared to the overall OPF market for
1) the twelve months prior to the suspension, 2) the suspension period itself, and 3)
the twelve months afterward (see Barber and Lyon (1997) for a detailed introduction
of the applied methodology). We use buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to
maintain an investor perspective. Based on the BHARs, we can infer how the
suspended OPFs performed compared to the overall market.
From Table 5, we note that the average BHARs are positive for all three time
periods, which implies that the sample of suspended OPFs performed better than the
overall market before, during, and after the suspension. The significantly positive
Table 3 Logit model predicting depreciation of property portfolio value within the period of temporary
share redemption suspension. We run the logit regressions so that the dependent variable equals 1 if the
OPF depreciated the value of its portfolio properties within the redemption suspension period (and 0 when
no depreciation took place). The exogenous variables are 1) the initial discount, as calculated in Eq. 3 after
the announcement of the redemption suspension (the first ten-day average), 2) ln(Size), calculated as the
logarithm of the OPFs’ assets under management, and 3) a period dummy variable indicating that the
event occurred during the first crisis period. We include all OPFs that have reopened or were suspended for
longer than six months. See Table 8 for a detailed listing of the included temporarily suspended OPFs









Number of Observations 17
a,
b, and
c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4 Ordinary least squares regression explaining the depreciation of OPF portfolio property values.
For this estimation, we use depreciation in absolute terms during the suspension period as a dependent
variable in both regressions. The exogenous variables are 1) the initial discount, as calculated in Eq. 3 after
the announcement of the redemption suspension (the first ten-day average), 2) ln(Size), calculated as the
logarithm of the OPFs’ assets under management, and 3) a period dummy variable indicating that the
event occurred during the first crisis period. We include all OPFs that have reopened or were suspended for
longer than six months. See Table 8 for a detailed listing of the included temporarily suspended OPFs









Number of Observations 17
a,
b, and
c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
D. Schweizer et al.performance of 2.40% during the twelve months after the suspension illustrates that
the suspended OPFs outperformed the market even when depreciations occurred
during or after the suspension period.
These results indicate that investors did not redeem their shares before the
suspension because of poor performance. Also, the overall positive performance
during and after the suspension indicates that no asset “fire sales” occurred. One
caveat is that the performance during the suspension should be examined with
caution, because not all OPFs reopened again. Performance would likely be
overestimated if OPF management were forced into a controlled liquidation.
In summary, the results from our short- and long-term analyses paint different
pictures. The short-term analysis highlights that, during temporary redemption
suspensions, investors who opt to sell their shares in the secondary market must
accept substantial discounts off the NA V . However, the results from our long-term
analysis imply that investors were better off holding their shares than selling them in
the secondary market. Because the more recent crisis period has not fully ended,
holding shares until a suspended OPF reopens will only be beneficial when OPF
reopen again within the two-year time limit, however. Otherwise, investors may face
a high level of uncertainty about the liquidation prices of portfolio properties within
the controlled liquidation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate that OPFs can provide diversification benefits to
investors that they cannot obtain by investing solely in other real estate vehicles such
as REITs. This is especially true for low-risk portfolios.
However, there is a significant difference between the liquidity risks of OPFs and
REITs. REIT liquidity is similar to that of ordinary common stock; OPF liquidity
depends on whether shares are currently redeemable. If they are, OPFs provide near-
perfect liquidity. If share redemptions have been temporarily suspended, however,
investors can face on average an initial discount of about 6% from fund NA Vs. This
discount reflects not only the decreased liquidity, but also expectations about future
depreciations of fund NA Vs.
But over the long-run, we find positive abnormal performance for funds that
temporarily suspended share redemptions and then subsequently reopened. Com-
Table 5 Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns for Temporarily Suspended OPFs. This table shows buy-and-
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for all temporarily suspended OPFs that subsequently reopened.
Abnormal returns are calculated relative to all open OPFs. See Table 8 for a detailed listing of the included
temporarily suspended OPFs
Average of all Suspended Funds BHAR Number of Observations
12 months before suspension 0.48% 12
During suspension 0.79% 12




c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Do Alternative Real Estate Investment V ehicles Add V alue to REITs…bining our diversification and liquidity results, we find that OPFs add value for
investors with a high level of risk aversion and a long-term investment horizon, such
as endowments, insurance companies, and pension funds. Investors who have more
freedom to wait out a suspension period and not resort to selling on the secondary
market will not be as affected by the reduced liquidity, and can reap greater
diversification benefits.
We believe one promising avenue for future research could be to explore how
other countries besides Germany could begin to start offering OPF-type investments
alongside REITs.
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Appendix
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for monthly return distributions. This table gives the mean, median,
standard deviation, the square root of lower partial moment 2 with threshold 0 (LPM), the conditional
value-at-risk (CV aR) with a 95% confidence level, maximum drawdown (MaxDD), skewness, kurtosis,
minimum, and maximum for the monthly return distribution for the February 1991-April 2010 period. All
measures are based on monthly data. The asset classes considered are real estate (OPFs after an
autocorrelation adjustment using Getmansky et al. (2004) method and REITs - the FTSE NAREIT Index),
equity markets (Nikkei 500, S&P 500, DJ Stoxx 600), bond markets (J.P . Morgan Japan, U.S., Europe, and
U.K. Government Bond Indices), and alternative investments (S&P GSCI and the HFRI Fund of Funds
Composite Index). All indices are total return (or their distributions were reinvested), and all are
denominated in U.S. dollars. We found no autocorrelation effects for the time series of equity and bond
markets or for alternative investments. We use the Jarque-Bera (1980) test to test for the assumption of
normally distributed monthly returns
Real Estate Equity Markets Bond Markets Alternative
Investments













Mean (%) 0.49% 1.09% 0.26% 0.82% 0.73% 0.64% 0.55% 0.58% 0.61% 0.47% 0.63%
Median (%) 0.18% 1.69% 0.06% 1.25% 1.11% 0.71% 0.66% 0.42% 0.73% 0.86% 0.77%
Std. Dev. (%) 3.15% 6.35% 6.50% 4.44% 5.23% 3.01% 1.38% 3.47% 3.09% 6.27% 1.73%
LPM 0.95% 1.49% 2.41% 1.30% 1.60% 0.87% 0.31% 0.99% 0.89% 2.15% 0.38%
CV aR −5.54% −14.85% −11.47% −10.29% −12.43% −5.90% −2.54% −6.65% −6.58% −13.64% −3.65%
MaxDD 30.65% 70.38% 66.71% 53.11% 60.65% 23.16% 5.41% 31.45% 25.05% 69.95% 22.20%
Skewness 0.53 −0.38 0.42 −0.55 −0.51 −0.02 −0.10 0.80 −0.26 −0.41 −0.69
Kurtosis 4.25 17.83 3.28 5.14 4.73 3.65 4.50 7.61 4.01 5.03 6.98
Minimum −9.22% −33.73% −16.04% −16.64% −20.72% −8.34% −4.49% −10.25% −10.55% −29.53% −7.47%














c indicate that the assumption of a normal distribution of monthly returns is rejected at the 1%.
5%. and 10% significance levels. respectively. All statistics are based on continuous returns.
D. Schweizer et al.Table 7 Correlation matrix. This table shows the correlations between the asset classes from Table 6.
V alues in boldface are significantly different from zero at the 5% level
















OPFs 1.00 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.07 −0.07 −0.07 0.05 −0.05 −0.09 0.08
REITs 0.18 1.00 0.21 0.59 0.55 0.24 −0.02 −0.03 0.20 0.20 0.12
NIKKEI 0.10 0.21 1.00 0.45 0.52 0.16 −0.06 0.32 0.15 0.29 0.08
S&P 500 0.17 0.59 0.45 1.00 0.82 0.13 −0.07 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.08
DJ STOXX 600 0.07 0.55 0.52 0.82 1.00 0.37 −0.11 0.11 0.37 0.32 0.11
JPM Europe −0.07 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.37 1.00 0.47 0.41 0.81 0.21 −0.05
JPM U.S. −0.07 −0.02 −0.06 −0.07 −0.11 0.47 1.00 0.29 0.40 −0.07 −0.15
JPM Japan 0.05 −0.03 0.32 0.03 0.11 0.41 0.29 1.00 0.26 −0.02 −0.13
JPM U.K. −0.05 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.81 0.40 0.26 1.00 0.20 0.11
S&P GSCI −0.09 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.32 0.21 −0.07 −0.02 0.20 1.00 0.16
HFRI FoHF 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 −0.05 −0.15 −0.13 0.11 0.16 1.00
Table 8 Summary of suspension dates of temporary share redemptions and related OPF names. This table
shows the suspension date, the reopening date (if applicable), and the fund name for all the OPFs that have
temporarily suspended share redemptions. We exclude the DEGI EUROPA because no price data was
available from Thomson Financial Datastream, BVI, or the capital investment company itself




1 Grundbesitz-Invest December 13, 2005 March 3, 2006
2 KanAm US-grundinvest Fonds January 17, 2006 March 31, 2006
3 KanAm grundinvest Fonds January 19, 2006 April 13, 2006
4 AXA Immoselect October 28, 2008 August 28, 2009
5 CS EUROREAL October 29, 2008 June 30, 2009
6 DEGI EUROPA October 30, 2008 –
7 DEGI INTERNA TIONAL October 30, 2008 January 30, 2009
8 Focus Nordic Cities October 28, 2008 January 28, 2009
9 KanAm US-grundinvest Fonds October 27, 2008 –
10 KanAm grundinvest Fonds October 28, 2008 July 8, 2009
11 Morgan Stanley P2 V alue October 30, 2008 –
12 SEB Immoinvest October 29, 2008 May 29, 2009
13 TMW Immobilien Weltfonds October 28, 2008 December 11, 2009
14 UBS (D) 3 Kontinente Immobilien
[renamed to UBS (D) 3 Sector
Real Estate Europe]
October 30, 2008 October 27, 2009
15 UBS (D) Euroinvest Immobilien
[investable for institutional
investors only]
October 30, 2008 August 6, 2009
16 DEGI INTERNA TIONAL November 16, 2009 –
17 AXA Immoselect November 17, 2009 –
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